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U.S. AND ANGLO-
AUSTRALIAN
DECISIONS ON A
HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO
PREVENT ABORTIONt
J. KODowo BENTIL
Evidently, abortion or pregnancy termination is one of the most con-
troversial moral, social and legal issues in contemporary Western society.
Varying and opposing views on the rightness or wrongness of it abound.
This has been fully acknowledged, for example, by American and Anglo-
Australian courts. Thus, in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade,' Justice Blackmun had occasion to observe: "We forth-
with acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of
the abortion controversy . . . and of the deep and seemingly absolute
convictions that the subject inspires."' Equally, in his judgment in the
English High Court in the case of Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory
Service Trustees,' Sir George Baker had this to say about the abortionissue: "Such action, of course, arouses great emotions and vigorous oppos-
ing views."' Again, in the subsequent English case of Royal College of
Nursing of the United Kingdom v. Department of Health and Social Se-
curity," Lords Wilberforce, Diplock, and Edmund-Davies, respectively,
expressed a similar view. Nor is it to be overlooked that, in his judgment
t This article is republished in substantial part from No. 102/103 LAW & JUSTICE 68 (1989).
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
2 Id. at 116. For a general discussion of the case see Crawford, Abortion Law in the United
States, 42 HILARY 19-32 (1974) and Smith, The Right to Privacy: Roe v. Wade Revisited,
84/85 HILARY/EASTER 34-47 (1985).
3 1 Q.B. 276 (1979).
' Id. at 278. For a general discussion of this case see Crawford, Abortion "Entitlement"
Absolute or Qualified? 58/59 TRINITY/MICHAELAMAS 68-80 (1978).
1981 App. Cas. 800, 822, 824, 829. For a general discussion of this case, see Glazebrook,
The Abortion Act: A Question of Interpretation, 68/69 HILARY/EASTER 5-8 (1981).
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in the Supreme Court of Queensland in the Australian case of K. v. T.,6
Justice Williams made a similar observation.
Not surprisingly, therefore, legislation permitting pregnancy termina-
tion has tended to be the product of compromise, in which various social
groups have sought to reconcile their views. Thus, in his speech in the
House of Lords in the English case of Royal College of Nursing, Lord
Edmund-Davies described the Abortion Act of 1967 as "the product of
considerable compromise between violently opposed and emotionally
charged views. ''7 Needless to say, this tended to create problems of inter-
pretation and application of the appropriate legislation.
Consequently, in a obvious attempt to maintain a neutral or a non-
partisan stance on the abortion issue, the courts purport not to be con-
cerned with examining and pronouncing on the ethical and social aspects
of the issue. Thus, in delivering the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Roe v. Wade,8 Justice Blackmun
had occasion to observe: "Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by
constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection."9
Equally, writing for the English High Court in the Paton case,' 0 Sir
George Baker maintained:
In the discussion of human affairs and especially of abortion, controversy
can rage over the moral rights, duties, interests, standards, and religious
views of the parties. Moral values are in issue. I am, in fact, concerned with
none of these matters. I am concerned, and concerned only, with the law of
England as it applies to this claim. My task is to apply the law free of emo-
tion or predilection."
A similar view was expressed by Justice Williams of the Supreme Court
of Queensland in the Australian case of K. v. T.'2 Whether, in actual
practice, the courts are able to adhere to this view may be debatable.
Even more controversial has become in recent years the specific issue
whether or not a potential father is legally entitled to prevent his preg-
nant wife or a woman pregnant by him from having her pregnancy termi-
nated. Indeed, American, English, and Australian superior courts have,
respectively, had occasion to reject the claim, even though some individ-
ual judges in the United States may have dissented from the general
view. Consequently, it is the purpose of this article to examine and assess
the relevant jurisprudence of American, English, and Australian superior
o 1 Q.R. 396, 396-97 (1983).
1981 App. Cas. at 829.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 116.
10 1 Q.B. 276 (1979).
" Id. at 278.
" 1 Q.R. 396, 397 (1983).
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courts concerning this particular issue.
AMERICAN JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE CLAIM
It is convenient to examine the reaction of the judiciary in the
United States to the claimed right of a potential father to prevent his
wife or a woman pregnant by him from having her pregnancy terminated
in the context of the following issues: (1) the legal status of a fetus, and
(2) the legal standing of a potential father to protect a fetus.
A. The Legal Status of a Fetus
While the question of the legal status of a fetus is governed by com-
mon law or statute or both within the respective jurisdictions of England
and Australia, the question, within the jurisdiction of the United States,
is governed by the federal Constitution. In particular, the fourteenth
amendment of the federal Constitution is deemed to cover the issue. In
general, however, the Supreme Court of the United States is not prepared
to accord a fetus legal personality, even though it seems prepared to ac-
cord a fetus legal protection at an advanced stage of development. Thus,
in delivering the opinion of the Court in Roe v. Wade, 3 Justice Blackmun
had occasion to point out that the word "person," as used in the four-
teenth amendment, did not include the unborn.' At the same time, how-
ever, he appears to have indicated that in certain circumstances, a fetus
might be "entitled to fourteenth amendment protection."' 5 Indeed, the
decision in that case tended to imply that a fetus reaching a viable stage
of development, generally a period of about three months after a preg-
nancy, could be accorded the relevant constitutional protection.
Nor is it to be overlooked that, in various American states, damages
claims for injury to, or wrongful death of, a viable fetus resulting from the
negligence or omission of another person have tended to be upheld by the
judiciary. 6
13 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
" Id. at 157;.
" 410 U.S. at 159.
1' See, e.g., Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp 529, 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town of
Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (1974); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 639
(La. 1981); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, (1949); O'Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo. 1983)(en banc); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617, 623
(1969); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826, 829-30 (Ct. App. 1980);
Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976); Vaillancourt v. Medical
Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980).
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B. Legal Standing of a Potential Father to Protect a Fetus
In general, the judiciary in the United States appears to discounte-
nance the idea of a potential father having legal standing to protect his
unborn child from being legally aborted. The rationale seems to be that a
married woman is a person in her own right and that her constitutional
right to privacy entitles her to exercise such right independently of her
husband. Consequently, since her right to undergo a pregnancy termina-
tion is a constitutional privacy right, the exercise of the right cannot be
interfered with by her husband.
Thus, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,' 7 the Supreme Court of the United
States, on being called upon to rule on the constitutionality of state legis-
lation restricting the distribution of contraceptives, had occasion to
maintain:
[TIhe marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.'"
Equally, in delivering the majority judgment of the same Court in the
subsequent case of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth,'9 Justice Blackmun ruled that a state had no constitutional author-
ity to grant a husband a unilateral right to prevent his pregnant wife
from having the pregnancy terminated.
Yet, in some earlier cases, the same Court found it necessary to rec-
ognize as a constitutionally protected entitlement a man's right to father
children and enjoy the association of his offspring. ° Nor is it to be over-
looked that, even though Justice Blackmun, in delivering the majority
judgment in the Danforth case, maintained that a state had no constitu-
tional authority to grant a husband a unilateral right to prevent his preg-
nant wife from having the pregnancy terminated, he recognized neverthe-
less "the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and
protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying," as well as the detrimental effect
that a pregnancy termination might have on the future of the marriage."
A fortiori, in delivering the dissenting opinion in the same case, with
17 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
18 Id. at 453.
9 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
20 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 649-58 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
" Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
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which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist agreed, Justice White
contended that a husband had an interest in the fetus he had been bio-
logically involved in bringing into being, and that it was improper for
such interest to be extinguished by a unilateral decision of his wife.2 He
then proceeded to observe:
It is truly surprising that the majority finds in the United States Constitu-
tion, as it must in order to justify the result it reaches, a rule that the state
must assign a greater value to a mother's decision to cut off a potential
human life by abortion than a father's decision to let it mature into a live
child."
Considering that the relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
the United States appears to go against a woman's constitutional privacy
right of having her pregnancy terminated when the pregnancy has
progressed beyond six months, could a potential father of the unborn
child then be entitled to prevent the termination of the pregnancy? No
clear answer seems to have been given to the question by the United
States Supreme Court. However, it is arguable that, in logic, the question
should be answered in the affirmative. As to whether this would be so, in
actual practice, is by no means certain. Incidentally, it needs to be noted
that, in generally rejecting a potential father's claim to be able to prevent
his pregnant wife from having the pregnancy terminated, at least within
the first six months of pregnancy, the relevant jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court does not particularly seek to distinguish
between a potential father who is lawfully married to the woman con-
cerned and one who is not so married to the woman. This seems to be so,
even though, in delivering the majority judgment of that Court in the
case of Roe v. Wade,24 Justice Blackmun had occasion to allude to "addi-
tional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood" as one of
the factors which could warrant an unmarried pregnant woman being al-
lowed to undergo a legal abortion. 5
ENGLISH JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE CLAIM
In the English context, the issue as to whether a potential father can
prevent his wife or woman pregnant by him from undergoing an abortion
by seeking to ensure the enforcement of the criminal law has been added
to the two other issues of the legal status of a fetus and the legal standing
of a potential father to prevent such abortion. Consequently, each of the
three issues needs to be considered separately.
22 Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Id. at 153.
33 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 3
A. The Legal Status of a Fetus
In contrast to the relative refusal of the judiciary in the United
States to treat a fetus as having a legal personality, the English judiciary
has tended to couch such denial in absolute terms. In other words, re-
gardless of its stage of growth and development, a fetus is outrightly de-
nied legal personality by the English judiciary.2" Thus, in his judgment in
the English High Court in the Paton case, Sir George Baker maintained:
"The fetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have a right of its own at
least until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother. That
permeates the whole of the civil law of this country."2 7
In addition, unlike American law, English law has tended to refuse to
recognize a claim for prenatal injury resulting from medical or other form
of negligence or omission of another person, Thus, in adverting to a con-
tention as to the possibility of a cause of action being available for pre-
natal injury resulting from any such negligence or omission, in his judg-
ment in the Paton case, Sir George Baker maintained emphatically:
"[B]ut there can be no doubt, in my view, that in England and Wales, the
fetus has no right of action, no right at all, until birth."2 8 Nor could the
decision of the Civil Division of the English Court of Appeal in the subse-
quent case of, for example, McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority,2 9 be
viewed as either affirming or denying a claim for prenatal injuries result-
ing from medical negligence or other omission. Even then, the Court of
Appeal held that a cause of action against the defendant local health au-
thorities could not lie in respect of physical deformities suffered by a fe-
tus as a result of rubella or German measles contracted by the mother
through medical negligence, even though the mother was subsequently
delivered of a live baby. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in the lat-
ter regard, the British Parliament subsequently passed the Congenital
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act in 1976 to allow a child born disabled, as
a result of injury inflicted on it while in its mother's womb, to recover
damages from the persons responsible for inflicting the injury.
B. Legal Standing of a Potential Father to Protect a Fetus
The English judiciary has, somehow, sought to distinguish between a
de facto potential father who is not lawfully married to a woman bearing
his child and a de jure potential father who is lawfully married to a wo-
26 See, e.g., Bentil, Rejection of Husband's Claim to Stop Wife's Abortion, 128 SOLIC. J. 288
(1984).
217 1 Q.B. 276, 279 (1979).
28 Id.
29 1 Q.B. 1166 (C.A. 1982). For a general look at this case see 60/61 HILARY/EASTER 59
(1979).
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man for whose pregnancy he is biologically responsible. Yet, for the pur-
pose of establishing a legal claim to protect his unborn child from being
aborted, a de jure potential father would not seem to have been treated
any differently than a de facto potential father by the courts. This is so,
even though, in his judgment in the Paton case,"0 Sir George Baker had
occasion to advert to the position of a de facto potential father, by point-
ing out: "[I]t seems to me that in this country the illegitimate father can
have no rights whatsoever except those given to him by statute. That was
clearly the common law."8 1
Indeed, he tended to use the general term "father" in his judgment
in that case. Consequently, he was in no doubt that a potential father had
no legal standing to prevent a woman bearing his child from having the
pregnancy legally terminated. Thus he stressed:
The Abortion Act [of] 1967 gives no right to a father to be consulted in
respect of a termination of a pregnancy. True, it gives no right to the
mother either, but obviously the mother is going to be right at the heart of
the matter consulting with the doctors if they are to arrive at a decision in
good faith, unless, of course, she is mentally incapacitated or physically in-
capacitated (unable to make any decision or give any help), as, for example,
in consequence of an accident.82
He stressed that, in considering the applicable law, "the first and basic
principle" was that "there must be a legal right enforceable in law or in
equity" before an application for an injunction to prevent a legal abortion
from being performed could be sustained." Consequently, he maintained:
"The husband, therefore, in my view, has no legal right enforceable in law
or in equity to stop his wife having this abortion or to stop the doctors
from carrying out this abortion." 4
C. May a Potential Father Prevent Pregnancy Termination by Seeking
to Enforce the Criminal Law?
Even though, in his judgment in the English High Court in the Paton
case, Sir George Baker sought to stress that a potential father had no
legal standing or right to prevent his pregnant wife from having the preg-
nancy terminated, he failed to indicate whether or not the father would
have legal standing or right to do so, where the pregnancy termination
was illegal or criminal." In other words, he failed to make it clear
SO 1 Q.B. at 279-80.
31 Id.
3I Id. at 281.
" Id. at 278.
3 Id. at 281.
See id. at 279-81.
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whether or not a potential father was capable of achieving his objective
by having recourse indirectly to an enforcement of the criminal law,
where the planned pregnancy termination may have been illegal.
On the other hand, in the more recent case of C. v. S.,36 a unanimous
English Court of Appeal rejected the idea of a potential father being able
to prevent a lawful pregnancy termination, by seeking to ensure a proper
enforcement of the criminal law. In the latter case, the plaintiff, a single
man and a postgraduate student at Oxford University, sought, on his own
behalf and as the next friend and father of a fetus which was eighteen to
twenty-one weeks en ventre sa mere, an injunction to restrain the defend-
ant, a single woman who was also a student at Oxford University and was
pregnant by him, from having the pregnancy terminated. At the same
time, the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the competent health
authority from having the abortion carried out, even though all the rele-
vant conditions of the Abortion Act of 1967 had been fulfilled. The appli-
cation for an injunction was based on the ground that the fetus was "a
child capable of being born alive" within the meaning by section 1(1) of
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, as specifically preserved by
section 5(1) of the Abortion Act. It should be noted that the relevant
legislative provisions have created the offense of child destruction. In ef-
fect, therefore, the plaintiff was seeking to bring about an enforcement of
such criminal law.
At first instance, Justice Heilbron, sitting in the Queen's Bench Divi-
sion of the High Court, accepted expert medical evidence as to the stage
of development the fetus would normally be expected to have reached.
The expert medical evidence suggested that the cardiac muscle of the fe-
tus would be contracting, that primitive blood circulation and physical
movements would be demonstrated by the fetus, but that, if delivered by
hysterotomy, such a fetus would never be able to breathe either naturally
or with artificial assistance. Consequently, Justice Heilbron held that the
applicant potential father had no legal standing to ask for an injunction,
and that she was not satisfied that a potential offense, under the Infant
Life (Preservation) Act in respect to child destruction, had been proved.
She then proceedk.d to dismiss the application of the potential father.
The latter then appealed to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal
against that decision of the High Court judge. But the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal and held that a fetus of between eighteen to twenty-
one weeks which showed signs of primitive movement and blood circula-
tion, but which, if delivered by hysterotomy, would never be capable of
breathing either naturally or artificially, was not "a child capable of being
born alive" within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Infant Life (Preser-
36 1 Q.B. 135 (C.A. 1988).
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vation) Act. Consequently, the Court of Appeal maintained that the abor-
tion of the fetus would not constitute an offense of child destruction
under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, and that, accordingly, regardless
of any question of locus standi or legal standing, the plaintiffs were not
entitled to an injunction to prevent the abortion from being carried out.
It is noteworthy that a subsequent petition by the applicants for leave to
appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed by the Appeal Committee of
the House of Lords.
Even then, it cannot be overlooked that the Court of Appeal did not
directly address the question whether or not the applicants would have
been entitled to the grant of an injunction to prevent the pregnancy ter-
mination from being carried out had such pregnancy termination been
deemed illegal or criminal under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. How-
ever, it appears that the applicants would not have been entitled to in-
junctive relief even in the latter situation. Presumably, it would then be
for the Crown Prosecution Service to undertake appropriate investiga-
tions into any such situation with a view to prosecuting the persons seek-
ing to carry out the unlawful termination of the pregnancy. In the ab-
sence of the intervention of the Crown Prosecution Service in the relevant
situation, therefore it seems that no one else may be able to intervene to
ensure a proper observance of the relevant criminal law. No doubt the
civil courts are justifiably unwilling to allow their processes to be used for
the purpose of enforcing the criminal law.3 7
AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE CLAIM
Just as in the English context, so in the Australian context, the issue
as to whether or not a potential father may be able to prevent his preg-
nant wife or a woman pregnant by him from having the pregnancy termi-
nated by means of an enforcement of the criminal law has been added to
the two other issues concerning the legal status of a fetus. Consequently,
it is appropriate to examine the Australian judicial reaction to the rele-
vant claim in terms of each of the three issues.
A. The Legal Status of a Fetus
Like English law, Australian law unequivocally refuses to accord a
fetus legal personality. This is so regardless of the stage of development a
fetus may have reached. Thus, in the case of K. v. T., 3s Justice Williams
stated: "I have not been able to find any reported case, nor was any cited
to me by counsel, in which the court's inherent jurisdiction over infants
37 See, e.g., Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, 1978 App. Cas. 435, 448 (H.L. (E.));
Attorney Gen. v. Able, 1 Q.B. 795, 807 (1984).
38 1 Q.R. 396 (1983).
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was held to include unborn children. Traditionally, personality for pur-
poses of the law began at birth and ended at death." 9 This appears to
have been subsequently endorsed by the full court of the Supreme Court
of Queensland"' and by Chief Justice Gibbs of the High Court of Austra-
lia,41 when the case came before the latter respective higher courts on
appeal from the decision of Justice Williams.
On the other hand, the Australian judiciary, unlike its English coun-
terpart, appears to have recognized the appropriateness of a claim for
pre-natal injury resulting from the negligence or the omission of another
person or persons. Thus, in the case of Watt v. Rama,'42 for example, the
full court of the Supreme Court of the State of Victoria held that a cause
of action in negligence against a defendant motorist in respect to injuries
suffered by a fetus as a result of the latter's negligent driving of a motor
car was capable of being legally sustained where the child was subse-
quently born alive. This may be said to be somewhat closer to the legal
position in most of the states in the United States, even though, in their
joint opinion in the Watt v. Rama case,4" Chief Justice Winneke and Jus-
tice Pape of the Supreme Court of Victoria professed not to have based
their decision on the relevant jurisprudence of the American courts. At
the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that, even though it was
assumed in the case of Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v. Thompson,""
which came before the Court of Appeal of the State of New South Wales,
that such a cause of action might lie in respect to injury of a fetus result-
ing from a mother having taken a thalidomide drug, yet, when the case
came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on a final ap-
peal, the latter tribunal sought to discountenance the idea.
B. Legal Standing of a Potential Father to Protect a Fetus
The attitude of the judiciary in Australia toward a potential father's
right to prevent a woman pregnant by him from having the pregnancy
terminated is no different from that of the judiciary in England. Indeed,
the Australian judiciary has, in this respect, tended to follow the English
judicial approach to the problem. Consequently, a potential father has
been deemed to have no right, enforceable in law or in equity, to prevent
a legal termination of a pregnancy for which he has been biologically re-
sponsible. Thus, in his judgment in the Supreme Court of Queensland in
'9 Id. at 400.
40 Attorney Gen., ex rel. Kerr v. T., 1 Q.R. 404, 407 (1983).
4 Attorney Gen. ex rel. v. T., 46 A.L.R. 275, 277 (1983).
"' 1972 V.R. 353. For a general discussion of this case see Wadsworth, Is the Unborn Child
Person at Law?, 36 TRINITY 88-92 (1972).
1972 V.R. at 356.
1971 App. Cas. 458 (P.C.).
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the case of K. v. T.,45 with which the full court of the same Court and
Chief Justice Gibbs, of the High Court of Australia, respectively, subse-
quently agreed on appeal, Justice Williams, had occasion to maintain:
"On the evidence before me in this case, I am not satisfied that this appli-
cant has established a legal right of the nature asserted which may be
protected by injunctive relief." '46
Nor is it to be overlooked that, even though the Australian judiciary
appears to view the relationship between a man and a woman who are
lawfully married differently from that between a man and a woman who
are not so lawfully married, yet, in the envisaged context, the distinction
hardly seems to have much consequence. In other words, a potential fa-
ther is treated as having no legal standing or right to prevent the lawful
termination of a pregnancy for which he has been biologically responsible,
irrespective of whether or not he may have been lawfully married to the
pregnant woman involved. This means that the Australian judicial atti-
tude is equally no different, in effect, from that of its English counterpart,
in this latter regard.
It should be noted that the case of K. v. T.47 itself involved a di-
vorced man and an unmarried mother who became pregnant by him. Six
weeks after the pregnancy, the woman informed the man of her condition
and indicated to him that she was going to have the pregnancy termi-
nated. At that time, she asked the man for financial assistance to cover
the cost of the planned pregnancy termination. Indeed, she showed him a
letter from her medical practitioner, which was addressed to another
medical practitioner with a recommendation for an abortion. However,
the man made it clear to the woman that he had "strong views about
abortion." Consequently, he offered to maintain the woman throughout
her pregnancy on condition that the child would be put up for adoption
after its birth. That appears to have been rejected by the woman. Appar-
ently, there was no doubt that the woman was perfectly healthy, and that
the only reason she gave for the planned pregnancy termination was that
"it would be the best for everybody." But the man applied to the Su-
preme Court of Queensland for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the
woman from having the pregnancy terminated. Needless to say, the appli-
cation was eventually rejected by the competent court and, on appeal, by
the competent appellate courts at both the state and the federal levels.
" 1 Q.R. 396 (1983).
' Id. at 402.
1 Q.R. 396 (1983).
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C. May a Potential Father Prevent Pregnancy Termination by Seeking
to Enforce the Criminal Law?
Like the English civil courts, the Australian civil courts have gener-
ally been unwilling to allow a private individual or even an appropriate
law officer to seek their aid for the purpose of preventing an actual or
potential commission of a public wrong or for the enforcement of the
criminal law.48 Indeed, the Australian civil courts have tended to follow
the example of their English counterparts in this regard. Consequently,
Australian civil courts may not be prepared to allow a potential father to
prevent the lawful termination of a pregnancy for which he has been bio-
logically responsible, by means of an enforcement of the criminal law.
Thus, in the case of K. v. T.,49 Justice Williams of the Supreme Court
of Queensland, in response to a contention that a potential father was
entitled to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion if he felt that
his wife or the woman pregnant by him was planning to have an illegal
abortion, maintained: "If the proposed operation is illegal (criminal), then
the applicant has no special legal right to have the operation stopped. His
interest is co-extensive with that of all citizens-he would be in reality
enforcing not a private but a public right."'50 In so maintaining, he sought
to rely on the authority of the decision of the House of Lords in the lead-
ing English case of Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers,51 as well as
on the judgment of Justice Gibbs (as he then was) of the Australian High
Court in the case of Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v.
Commonwealth.
52
Nor is it to be overlooked that, when the case of K. v. T.,53 came
before the full court of the Supreme Court of Queensland on appeal from
the judgment of Justice Williams, that full court equally sought to rely on
the authority of the decision of the House of Lords in the same leading
English case of Gouriet,5 4 and proceeded to observe:
If a criminal offence is ultimately committed, its detection will be a matter
for the law enforcement agencies with the consequences which that detec-
tion entails. It seems to us that the proper exercise of the discretion of this
Court in circumstances of this kind should be to refuse an application for an
injunction, since the provisions of the [Queensland] Criminal Code contain
stern sanctions with plainly deterrent effect [against an illegal termination
See, e.g., Australian Conservation Found. Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493 (1980);
Commonwealth v. John Fairfax & Sons, Ltd., 147 C.L.R. 39 (1980).
49 1 Q.R. 396 (1983).
:o Id. at 402-03.
5' 1978 App. Cas. 435 (H.L.(E.)).
52 146 C.L.R. 493 (1980).
.3 1 Q.R. 396 (1983).
14 1978 App. Cas. 435.
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of pregnancy]2.8
A similar view appears to have been held by Chief Justice Gibbs in the
High Court of Australia when the case came before him on appeal from
the full court of the Supreme Court of Queensland."
Besides, even though the Attorney General of Queensland was subse-
quently invited by Justice Williams to assume the position of an amicus
curiae in the proceedings, and the Attorney General did so in a kind of
subsequent relator action on behalf of the potential father concerned,
that appears to have made little or no difference to the conclusion of the
full court of the Supreme Court of Queensland. Indeed, the latter court
doubted "whether in these circumstances an injunction to restrain the
commission of this suspected criminal offence should be granted. '57 This
appears to have been equally endorsed by Chief Justice Gibbs in the High
Court of Australia when the case came before him on appeal from the full
court of the Supreme Court of Queensland."
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Even though American and Anglo-Australian courts have shown a
general unwillingness to accord a fetus legal personality, nevertheless,
American courts seem flexible in their attitude towards the need for pro-
tecting it at some stage in its development. For instance, the Supreme
Court of the United States may be said to have ruled against a pregnant
woman having a constitutional privacy right to have the pregnancy termi-
nated during the third trimester of the pregnancy. Nor is it to be over-
looked that, in delivering the majority judgment of that Court in the case
of Roe v. Wade,8 Justice Blackmun pointed out:
The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that
some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. ...
[A] State. may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some im-
portant point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion de-
cision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.6 0
On the other hand, American, English and Australian courts have all
tended to reject outrightly a claim by a husband or an unmarried man to
prevent his pregnant wife or a woman pregnant by him from having the
5 1 Q.R. at 406.
s 46 A.L.R. 275, 277 (1983).
1978 App. Cas. at 405.
5' 46 A.L.R. at 277.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 153-54.
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pregnancy terminated. This has been so even though some strong dissent-
ing views have been expressed by individual justices on the United States
Supreme Court in that regard. Thus, poignantly enough, in delivering the
majority judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth61 Justice Blackmun, had this to say
about the matter:
We recognize, of course, that when a woman, with the approval of her phy-
sician but without the approval of her husband, decides to terminate her
pregnancy, it could be said that she is acting unilaterally. The obvious fact
is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of
only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance
weighs in her favor.2
Whether or not this would be so where the purported pregnancy termina-
tion may have been an illegal one was not made clear in that judgment.
In contrast to the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Danforth,3 the strong dissenting opinion of the minority
of that same Court in the case delivered by Justice White, with which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist agreed, appears to have been
in favor of a potential father being accorded a right to prevent his preg-
nant wife from unilaterally having the pregnancy terminated. 4 Indeed,
Justice White stressed: "A father's interest in having a child-perhaps his
only child-may be unmatched by any other interest in his life."6
CONCLUSION
No doubt, where a woman's pregnancy threatens her very life, or
there are strong reasons for protecting her physical and mental health, a
termination of the pregnancy may be morally and legally justified. In any
situation, it would be untenable for her husband or the man by whom she
became pregnant to be allowed to interfere with or prevent the pregnancy
from being terminated. On the other hand, where the woman wishes to
have the pregnancy legally terminated on account of social convenience or
for some less compelling medical reason, there may be a justification for
the husband being able to have a say in whether or not the pregnancy
termination ought to take place. Yet the courts in the United States, Eng-
land and Australia seem unprepared to concede this. Consequently, the
61 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
62 Id. at 71.
6 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64 Id. at 93. (White, J., dissenting).
6I Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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contemporary feminist movement clamor for a woman to have an abso-
lute right to control her own body and thus to be able to decide unilater-
ally and without any legal hindrance to have her pregnancy terminated
appears to have received a limited amount of judicial approval. Yet this
may not be all that socially or morally desirable.

